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WHEN DOES THE CHAIN BREAK? PRESCRIBING
AROUND DRUG MANUFACTURER FRAUD
INTRODUCTION
Approximately eleven million prescriptions are written every day in
the United States,1 and each prescription decision represents one link
in a long and complex chain that begins with drug manufacturers and
ends with the patient.2 What happens when that first link, the drug
manufacturer, misleads healthcare systems, physicians, and the Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) regarding a drug’s side effects?3
Over the past decade, several pharmaceutical companies have been
subject to Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO) claims for engaging in fraudulent and misleading practices.4
RICO prohibits the generation of income from racketeering activity5
including mail and wire fraud,6 which are common methods of misleading and fraudulent conduct.7
Third Party Payors (TPPs),8 such as healthcare plans and insurance
companies, have actively brought claims against manufacturers as
TPPs pay a percentage of or the entire cost of their members’ prescriptions.9 RICO claims have proven profitable for plaintiffs,10 with
1. Alexandra Sifferlin, Americans Spent a Record Amount on Medicine in 2014, TIME (Apr.
13, 2015), http://time.com/3819889/medicine-spending/.
2. See In re Avandia Mktg., Sales Practices & Prod. Liab. Litig., 804 F.3d 633, 645–46 (3d Cir.
2015); In re Neurontin Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 712 F.3d 21, 38 (1st Cir. 2013); UFCW
Local 1776 v. Eli Lilly & Co., 620 F.3d 121, 134 (2d Cir. 2010); United Food & Commercial
Workers Cent. Pa. & Reg’l Health & Welfare Fund v. Amgen, Inc., 400 F. App’x 255, 257 (9th
Cir. 2010).
3. In re Avandia, 804 F.3d at 635–36; In re Neurontin, 712 F.3d at 27–29; UFCW Local 1776,
620 F.3d at 124–25, 127–28; In re Epogen & Aranesp Off-Label Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig.,
590 F. Supp. 2d 1282, 1290–91 (C.D. Cal. 2008).
4. See, e.g., In re Avandia, 804 F.3d at 635; In re Neurontin, 712 F.3d at 27–29; UFCW Local
1776, 620 F.3d at 134–36; United Food & Commercial Workers Cent. Pa., 400 Fed. App’x at 257.
5. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (2016).
6. § 1961(1).
7. See, e.g., Sergeants Benevolent Ass’n Health & Welfare Fund v. Sanofi-Aventis U.S. LLP,
806 F.3d 71, 74 (2d Cir. 2015); In re Avandia, 804 F.3d at 636; In re Neurontin, 712 F.3d at 34; In
re Epogen, 590 F. Supp. 2d at 1287.
8. Third Party Payors (TPPs) are organizations, both public and private, which pay or insure
health and medical expenses for consumers. Common examples of TPPs are insurance companies, healthcare plans and Medicare. Third Party Payor, AM. HEALTH LAW ASS’N, https://
www.healthlawyers.org/hlresources/Health%20Law%20Wiki/Third%20Party%20Payor.aspx
(last visited Jan. 10, 2017).
9. In re Avandia, 804 F.3d at 634–35; In re Neurontin, 712 F.3d at 38–39; UFCW Local 1776,
620 F.3d at 134–36; United Food & Commercial Workers Cent. Pa., 400 F. App’x at 257.
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courts awarding damages as high as $147 million to a single plaintiff.11
Recent data indicates total expenditures for prescription medication
in the United States exceeds $374 billion annually.12 Thus, drug manufacturers are incentivized to aggressively market their products, obtain market share, and maximize profits.13 Accordingly, they spend
over $20 billion each year on drug promotion.14 Conversely, healthcare systems and insurance companies are suffering multi-million dollar losses because of manufacturer fraud.15
A federal circuit split exists as to whether TPPs are permitted to
bring RICO claims against drug manufacturers. The underlying issue
is whether the independent decisions of physicians to prescribe the
manufacturer’s drug to patients severs the chain of causation and precludes TPPs from bringing a RICO claim against that manufacturer.16
The First and Third Circuits hold that TPPs may bring RICO claims
against pharmaceutical companies because the presence of intermediaries does not break the chain of causation.17 In 2013, the
First Circuit held in In re Neurontin that the prescription decisions of
doctors do not effect RICO causation.18 This approach was echoed by
the Third Circuit in In re Avandia when it held the presence of intermediaries, such as doctors and patients, does not disrupt causation
in RICO claims.19
The Second and Ninth Circuits have a different approach.20 In
UFCW Local 1776 v. Eli Lilly & Co., the Second Circuit held that
physician prescription decisions sever the chain of causation.21 Similarly, in United Food & Commercial Workers Central Pennsylvania v.
Amgen, Inc., the Ninth Circuit dismissed a complaint because it al10. This data is based on 2014 expenditures. Sifferlin, supra note 1.
11. In re Neurontin Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 799 F. Supp. 2d 110, 112 (D. Mass. 2011).
12. This data is based on 2014 expenditures. Sifferlin, supra note 1.
13. Id.
14. Brief for AARP et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Sergeants Benevolent
Ass’n Health & Welfare Fund v. Sanofi-Aventis U.S. LLP at 3–4, 137 S. Ct. 140 (2016) (mem)
(No. 15-1525) (citing Persuading the Prescribers: Pharmaceutical Industry Marketing and its Influence on Physicians and Patients, PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS (Nov. 11, 2013), http://tinyurl.com/
mac4o5d).
15. See, e.g., In re Neurontin, 712 F.3d at 32 (noting Kaiser estimated it suffered $60 million in
losses as a result of Pfizer’s misrepresentations).
16. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Sergeants Benevolent Ass’n Health & Welfare Fund v.
Sanofi-Aventis United States LLP at 2–5, 137 S. Ct. 140 (2016) (mem) (No. 15-1525).
17. In re Avandia, 804 F.3d at 643–46; In re Neurontin, 712 F.3d at 34–36.
18. In re Neurontin, 712 F.3d at 38–39.
19. In re Avandia, 804 F.3d at 645.
20. UFCW Local 1776, 620 F.3d at 132; United Food & Commercial Workers Cent. Pa., 400 F.
App’x at 257 (holding that prescription decision by doctors break the chain of causation).
21. UFCW Local 1776, 620 F.3d at 135.
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leged a weak causal chain between the drug manufacturer and TPPs
and therefore failed to meet RICO’s proximate cause requirements.22
In June 2016 in Sergeants Benevolent Association Health & Welfare
Fund v. Sanofi-Aventis U.S. LLP, a healthcare plan appealed the dismissal of its RICO claim.23 The Supreme Court denied the petition
for certiorari leaving the split unresolved.24
This Comment contends the First and Third Circuits’ approach, that
the presence of intermediaries does not break the chain of causation,
should be adopted because pharmaceutical manufacturer’s marketing
efforts target TPPs. In turn, when manufacturers engage in fraudulent
behavior TPPs suffer economic injury by paying the majority of the
drug’s cost once it is prescribed.25 Part II provides an overview of the
RICO statute and describes the methodology used by TPPs to determine whether to pay for a drug prescribed to its members.26 In addition, Part II details both sides of the Circuit split.27
Part III argues the Supreme Court should adopt the First and Third
Circuits’ approach because: (1) TPPs are directly injured by the fraudulent conduct of drug manufacturers28 and (2) such an injury is cognizable under RICO.29 Part IV explains the impact of adopting the First
and Third Circuits’ approach on: (1) the protection of healthcare consumer health and safety through deterrence of drug manufacturer
fraud and (2) the ability of TPPs to obtain compensation for economic
loss suffered due to manufacturer fraud when the causal chain between manufacturers and TPPs is kept intact.30 Finally, Part V concludes that allowing TPPs to bring RICO claims regardless of
physician prescription decisions will ensure drug manufacturers are
accountable for their fraudulent actions, will protect consumers from
22. United Food & Commercial Workers Cent. Pa., 400 F. App’x at 257.
23. Sergeants brought suit against Sanofi-Aventis, a pharmaceutical company, for allegedly
misleading doctors and the FDA regarding the safety of an antibiotic developed by the company
in an effort to boost its prescriptions. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Sergeants Benevolent Ass’n
Health & Welfare Fund at 10–12, 137 S. Ct. 140 (2016) (mem) (No. 15-1525).
24. Sergeants Benevolent Ass’n Health & Welfare Fund, 137 S. Ct. 140 (2016) (mem) (No. 151525) (denying petition for certiorari).
25. See In re Avandia, 804 F.3d at 644; In re Neurontin, 712 F.3d at 39.
26. In re Avandia, 804 F.3d at 635; In re Neurontin, 712 F.3d at 43; UFCW Local 1776, 620
F.3d at 134–36; United Food & Commercial. Workers Cent. Pa., 400 F. App’x at 257.
27. In re Avandia, 804 F.3d at 635; In re Neurontin, 712 F.3d at 26–27; UFCW Local 1776, 620
F.3d at 125; United Food & Commercial Workers Cent. Pa. 400 F. App’x at 257.
28. Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 269–70 (1992); In re Neurontin, 712 F.3d
at 36.
29. In re Neurontin, 712 F.3d 34.
30. See infra Part IV.
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physical injury resulting from unsafe drugs, and fairly compensate
TPPs that have suffered economic loss.31
II.

BACKGROUND

This Part explains the circuit split regarding whether prescription
decisions of physicians break the chain of causation in RICO claims.
Section A describes the relevant RICO provisions.32 Section B explains how TPPs approve drugs for members.33 Section C canvasses
the approach of the First and Third Circuits.34 Finally, Section D describes the Second and Ninth Circuits’ holdings that prescription decisions by physicians are fatal to the RICO claims of TPPs.35
A. A Brief Overview of RICO Claims
The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act, commonly referred to as “RICO,”36 prohibits the derivation of income
from racketeering activity,37 or association with an enterprise affecting
interstate commerce through a pattern of racketeering activity.38 The
term “racketeering activity” includes mail and wire fraud,39 which are
common grounds upon which TPPs bring RICO claims.40 RICO was
initially introduced to combat organized crime by connecting mafia
leaders to the criminal enterprises they oversaw.41 During RICO’s
legislative hearings, however, the Act’s supporters successfully proposed the inclusion of private civil actions.42 Congress subsequently
included a provision allowing private parties injured by racketeering
activity to bring a civil action against wrongdoers.43 This provision
enables TPPs to bring RICO claims against pharmaceutical
manufacturers.
31. See In re Neurontin, 712 F.3d at 39–40; UFCW Local 1776, 620 F.3d at 129.
32. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–62, 1964 (2016).
33. See In re Avandia, 804 F.3d at 634–35.
34. See id.; In re Neurontin, 712 F.3d at 38–39.
35. UFCW Local 1776, 620 F.3d at 134; United Food & Commercial Workers Cent. Pa., 400 F.
App’x at 257.
36. In re Neurontin, 712 F.3d at 26.
37. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (2016).
38. § 1962(c).
39. § 1961(1).
40. See, e.g., Sergeants Benevolent Ass’n Health & Welfare Fund, 806 F.3d at 74; In re Avandia,
804 F.3d at 636; In re Neurontin, 712 F.3d at 34; In re Epogen, 590 F. Supp. 2d at 1287.
41. Nathan Koppel, They Call It RICO, and It Is Sweeping, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 20, 2011, 5:14
PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704881304576094110829882704.
42. John L. Koenig, What Have They Done to Civil RICO: The Supreme Court Takes the
Racketeering Requirement Out of Racketeering, 35 AM. U. L. REV. 821, 828–29 & n.33 (1986).
43. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2016).
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In order to recover damages under RICO, a plaintiff must show the
following: (1) a substantive RICO violation under 18 U.S.C. § 1962,44
(2) an injury to the plaintiff’s business or property,45 and (3) that the
injury was caused by the substantive RICO violation.46 The third element constitutes the causation requirement.47 A party bringing a
RICO claim can sue to recover treble damages, court costs, and attorney’s fees.48 It is within this framework that TPPs pursue fraud claims
against drug manufacturers.49
B. How a Third Party Payor Selects Drugs for its Members
TPPs cover the cost of prescriptions for drugs listed in its “formulary,” which is a list of drugs approved for use by the TPP’s members.50 The formulary is prepared by a Pharmacy Benefit Manager
(PBM)51 who carefully analyzes “research regarding a drug’s cost effectiveness, safety and efficacy.”52 The PBM uses this research to develop a series of monographs53 that summarize all the evidence on the
drug under consideration for inclusion in the formulary.54 During the
screening process and monograph preparation, PBMs can be directly
and indirectly influenced by the input of drug manufacturers.55
44. UFCW Local 1776, 620 F.3d at 129. A substantive RICO violation involves engaging in
any of the “racketeering” activities listed in 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1), such as mail and wire fraud.
This is a common ground for RICO claims against drug manufacturers as they circulate their
misrepresentations to TPPs using these methods.
45. Bridge v. Phx. Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639, 649 (2008) (clarifying that such injury is
economic in nature, and constitutes injury to one’s business or property); UFCW Local 1776, 620
F.3d at 131.
46. UFCW Local 1776, 620 F.3d at 131.
47. Id. Although this Comment focuses specifically on proximate cause it should be noted
that the RICO statute contains both proximate cause and but-for causation requirements.
Holmes, 503 U.S. at 268 (1992). See also In re Avandia, 804 F.3d at 645 (quoting Bridge, 553 U.S.
at 650, 658); In re Neurontin, 712 F.3d at 34.
48. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2016).
49. See e.g,. In re Avandia, 804 F.3d at 634–36; In re Neurontin, 712 F.3d at 26; UFCW Local
1776, 620 F.3d at 132; United Food & Commercial Workers Cent. Pa., 400 F. App’x at 257.
50. In re Avandia, 804 F.3d 634–35.
51. Id. The formulary is sometimes prepared by a committee, rather than a PBM. For instance, Kaiser formularies were managed by a Pharmacy and Therapeutics Committee. In re
Neurontin, 712 F.3d at 28–29.
52. In re Avandia, 804 F.3d at 634–35.
53. A monograph is a piece of writing typically used to present research on a single subject or
aspect of a subject. See Monograph, DICTIONARY.COM, http://www.dictionary.com/browse/monograph (last visited Nov. 13, 2016). In the context of drug manufacturing they provide descriptions of drug, development information, treatments it can be used for, and dosage information.
How Drugs are Developed and Approved, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/
drugs/developmentapprovalprocess/howdrugsaredevelopedandapproved/ (last visited Nov. 13,
2016).
54. In re Neurontin, 712 F.3d at 28–29.
55. Id. at 28.
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PBMs are directly influenced by the evidence and unpublished information regarding drug safety possessed by drug manufacturers.56
TPPs obtain this data from manufacturers utilizing it to prepare
monographs.57 In turn, PBMs rely heavily on the monographs when
making formulary decisions.58 Additionally, pharmaceutical companies indirectly influence TPPs’ formulary determinations.59 For instance, a pharmaceutical company will build relationships with
influential TPP affiliates and also employ physicians associated with
TPPs to publish favorable articles about the company’s drug.60
If a PBM determines a particular drug is more advantageous than a
competing drug after the research and monograph phase, the more
advantageous drug is given preferred status on the formulary.61 Consequently, the higher a drug’s preferential status on the formulary, the
more of its cost a TPP will cover.62 This, in turn, will reduce the copayment a member must pay when a physician prescribes the drug.63
TPPs rely considerably on representations made by, and information obtained from, manufacturers throughout the process of approving a drug for inclusion in its formulary.64 Doctors then rely on the
TPP’s formulary, which is directly and indirectly influenced by the
drug manufacturers. This raises questions as to whether subsequent
doctor prescription decisions are sufficiently independent to sever the
causal relationship between drug manufacturers and TPPs.65
C. First and Third Circuits: Physicians’ Prescription Decisions Keep
the Causal Chain Intact
This Section explores the First and Third Circuits’ approach to
RICO causation. It explores the First Circuit’s decision in In re
Neurontin66 and then analyzes the Third Circuit’s approach in In re
Avandia.67
56. Id. at 29.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 28.
60. In re Neurontin, 712 F.3d at 28.
61. In re Avandia, 804 F.3d at 635; In re Neurontin, 712 F.3d at 28–29.
62. In re Avandia, 804 F.3d at 635.
63. Id.
64. E.g., In re Neurontin, 712 F.3d at 29.
65. In re Avandia, 804 F.3d at 643–46; In re Neurontin, 712 F.3d at 29; UFCW Local 1776, 620
F.3d at 134–36; United Food & Commercial Workers Cent. Pa., 400 F. App’x at 257.
66. In re Neurontin, 712 F.3d at 21.
67. In re Avandia, 804 F.3d at 633.
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1. First Circuit Approach to RICO Causation
The First Circuit holds that prescription decisions of prescribing
doctors pose no bar to RICO causation.68 In In re Neurontin, healthcare giant Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. (Kaiser) alleged drug
manufacturer Pfizer, Inc. (Pfizer) violated RICO § 1962 by fraudulently marketing Neurontin, an anti-epileptic drug, for off-label uses.69
In 1993, the FDA approved the drug for the treatment of epileptic
seizures and set the maximum daily dose at 1800 milligrams.70 In
1995, Pfizer developed strategies to market the drug for off-label uses
such as migraines and bipolar disorder.71 Over the next few years,
Pfizer began marketing to TPPs for such uses in doses exceeding the
FDA-approved 1800 milligrams per day.72 These marketing efforts
proved effective as Neurontin sales reached $2 billion in 2003 and
over one-third of the prescriptions treated off-label indications.73
However, throughout this process Pfizer failed to disclose potential
depression-related side effects.74 In 2008, the FDA issued a warning
to physicians regarding the possibility of depression, suicidal tendencies, and unusual changes in patient behavior.75
Kaiser relied on the manufacturer’s misrepresentations in the preparation of its monographs, directly affecting Kaiser’s decision to place
Neurontin on its formulary without restrictions.76 Evidence showed
that Kaiser’s “physicians received and acted upon Pfizer’s misrepresentations . . . through information sent [to them] . . . and information
provided to [the physicians] at Pfizer-sponsored events.”77 If Pfizer
had not misrepresented Neurontin’s safety issues, PBM’s monograph
would have contained more accurate information regarding the drug’s
risks. As a result, the drug likely would not have been given preferential status on Kaiser’s formulary.78 Consequently, Kaiser suffered an
injury by reimbursing its members for Neurontin, rather than cheaper
alternatives available on the market.79 Kaiser estimated Pfizer’s fraud
68. In re Neurontin, 712 F.3d at 38–39.
69. Id. at 27–28. Off-label conditions are those not included in the official FDA-approved
drug label. Id.
70. Id. at 27.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 28.
73. In re Neurontin, 712 F.3d at 27.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 29. Such restrictions, for instance, would have included warnings for the depressive
behavior Pfizer failed to disclose. Id. at 27.
77. Id. at 40–41.
78. In re Neurontin, 712 F.3d at 40–41.
79. Id.
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resulted in over $60 million in damages from prescription
reimbursement.80
In finding Pfizer’s misrepresentations satisfied RICO’s proximate
cause requirement, the First Circuit relied on common law “directness,” as well as three functional factors formulated by the Supreme
Court.81 Regarding the common law standard, the Supreme Court
noted in Holmes that a proximate cause analysis generally requires a
direct relationship between the injury suffered and the alleged injurious conduct.82 The Court also elucidated the following factors for
courts to consider when making the proximate cause inquiry: (1) proof
of injury, (2) administrative efficiency, and (3) public policy.83 Furthermore, the Court in Holmes noted the difficulty and complexity of
calculating damages when an injury is less direct.84 The Court noted
that “recognizing claims of the indirectly injured would force courts to
adopt complicated rules apportioning damages among plaintiffs removed at different levels of injury from the violative acts”.85 However, in Bridge the Court unanimously held that first-party reliance on
the misrepresentation is not required under RICO.86
Based on these considerations, the First Circuit held “the causal
chain is anything but attenuated” between the drug manufacturer and
TPPs.87 The court emphasized Pfizer understood the structure of the
U.S. healthcare system and the fact that TPPs, not physicians, pay for
the drugs.88 Further, Pfizer’s fraudulent marketing scheme was dependent upon Kaiser paying for the drug.89 Accordingly, their economic injury was foreseeable.90 The Court held the causal link is not
automatically broken even if a manufacturer directs its alleged misrepresentations towards prescribing doctors.91 Therefore, in the First
Circuit direct reliance on the misrepresentations by TPPs is not
required.92
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id. at 32.
Id. at 36 (citing Holmes, 503 U.S. at 268).
Id. (citing Holmes, 503 U.S. at 268).
Id. (citing Holmes, 503 U.S. at 269–70).
In re Neurontin, 712 F.3d at 36 (citing Holmes, 503 U.S. at 269).
Id. (quoting Holmes, 503 U.S. at 269).
Id. at 36–37 (citing Bridge, 553 U.S. at 641).
Id. at 38.
Id. at 38–39.
Id.
In re Neurontin, 712 F.3d at 38–39.
Id. at 37.
Id.
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2. Third Circuit Approach to RICO Causation
The Third Circuit echoes the First Circuit approach, asserting the
presence of intermediaries, such as doctors and patients, does not destroy causation in RICO claims.93 In In re Avandia, TPPs argued
GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) misrepresented safety risks associated with
Avandia, a Type II diabetes drug.94 Once the FDA approved Avandia
in 1999, GSK marketed the drug as cheaper and more effective than
existing Type II diabetes drugs.95 Consequently, TPPs included
Avandia in its formularies and covered the cost of prescriptions at a
favorable rate.96 However, health concerns related to the drug began
surfacing in 2001.97 Following the FDA’s request, GSK added a prescription label warning that the drug may cause increased risk of fluid
retention.98 Five years later, Avandia’s label required an additional
warning that the drug may cause increased risk of heart-related issues,
including heart attack.99 The situation further deteriorated in 2007
when the FDA recommended the addition of “black box” warnings100
to Avandia’s label to warn of the risk of heart failure.101 Then in 2010,
a U.S. Senate Finance Committee report concluded GSK was aware
of these cardiac risks for years yet “failed to notify the FDA and the
public of these risks despite its duty to do so.”102
In reaching its decision, the Third Circuit relied on the Supreme
Court’s holding in Bridge.103 In Bridge, Phoenix Bond & Indemnity.
Co. (Phoenix) bid for county tax liens in Illinois and brought a RICO
claim alleging its competitors committed mail fraud by making misrepresentations during the bidding process.104 Phoenix claimed its
competitors engaged in fraud by mailing notices containing misrepresentations to property owners.105 However, the competitors argued
Phoenix did not rely on those alleged representations—the property
93. In re Avandia, 804 F.3d at 645.
94. Id. at 634.
95. Id. at 635.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. In re Avandia, 804 F.3d at 635.
100. A black box warning is listed on the label of a prescription drug to warn of serious and
life-threatening risks of the drug. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., A Guide to Drug Safety Terms at
FDA, http://www.fda.gov/downloads/ForConsumers/ConsumerUpdates/UCM107976.pdf. (last
visited Nov. 13, 2016).
101. In re Avandia, 804 F.3d at 635.
102. Id. at 635–36.
103. Bridge, 553 U.S. at 639.
104. Id.
105. Id.
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owners did.106 Consequently, the Supreme Court held no general
principle states misrepresentation can only cause injury to a party that
relies on it, but rather, a “plaintiff’s loss must be a foreseeable result
of someone’s reliance on the misrepresentation.”107
In applying Bridge’s holding, the court in Avandia considered the
TPPs to be the “primary and intended victims of the scheme to defraud.” Accordingly, the economic harm suffered was a “foreseeable
and natural consequence of [the] scheme.”108 Because the TPPs paid
for these drugs they were the intended victims. In fact, GSK’s fraudulent scheme could only be successful if the TPPs paid GSK for the
drug.109
D. Second and Ninth Circuit Courts: Physicians’ Prescription
Decisions Sever the Causal Chain
This Section explores the Second and Ninth Circuits’ approach to
RICO causation, which hold prescription decisions of physicians sever
causation between manufacturers and TPPs.110 First, this Section discusses the Second Circuit’s decision in UFCW Local 1776 v. Eli Lilly
& Co.,111 and then explores the Ninth Circuit’s approach in United
Food & Commercial Workers Central Pennsylvania v. Amgen, Inc.112
1. Second Circuit Approach to RICO Causation
Unlike the First and Third Circuits, the Second Circuit held in
UFCW Local 1776 that physician prescription decisions sever the
chain of causation.113 In 1996, the FDA approved Eli Lilly’s drug
Zyprexa for treating schizophrenia.114 In 2000, the company began
marketing the drug directly to physicians for off-label uses.115 While
physicians are permitted to prescribe drugs for off-label uses, “manufacturers are prohibited from promoting off-label uses in marketing a
drug.”116 TPPs argued that Eli Lilly turned its marketing efforts to106. Id.
107. Id. at 655.
108. In re Avandia, 804 F.3d at 645 (quoting Bridge, 553 U.S. at 658).
109. Id. at 645.
110. UFCW Local 1776, 620 F.3d at 134; United Food & Commercial Workers Cent. Pa., 400
F. App’x at 257.
111. UFCW Local 1776, 620 F.3d at 135.
112. United Food & Commercial Workers Cent. Pa., 400 F. App’x at 257.
113. UFCW Local 1776, 620 F.3d at 135.
114. Id. at 124.
115. Id. at 127.
116. Id. Manufacturers are prohibited from advertising or promoting drugs for off-label uses
in an effort to protect patients from using the drugs to treat conditions for which there is little to
no clinical evidence to support such use. Off-label Use: The Fine Line Between Illegal Promotion
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wards physicians to promote off-label uses of Zyprexa.117 For example, Eli Lilly targeted the nursing home industry and instructed 280
sales representatives to suggest to physicians that Zyprexa was beneficial for diseases such as dementia.118 Such assertions were made despite a lack of evidence that the drug was effective for treating
dementia—in fact clinical evidence showed it was detrimental to the
cognitive function of Alzheimer’s patients.119 This marketing approach yielded some success; by 2002 approximately two-thirds of
Zyprexa’s prescriptions were for off-label purposes.120
In 2003, however, the FDA required labelling changes to Zyprexa
to warn of pancreatitis, hyperglycemia, and diabetes.121 In 2005, a
black box warning was added to warn of increased risk of death for
elderly dementia patients.122 Following the label changes, consumption of the drug experienced a 50% decrease between 2003 and
2008.123
Unsurprisingly, TPPs brought a RICO claim alleging that Eli Lilly
became aware of some harmful side effects during the drug’s development and failed to disclose this to the FDA, even after the drug made
it to the market.124 In particular, TPPs asserted the drug was associated with significant weight gain and that Eli Lilly falsely marketed
the drug as superior despite knowing of this serious side effect.125
In holding that prescription decisions sever proximate cause in
RICO cases, the court described the causal chain as follows: “[the
manufacturer] distributes misinformation about Zyprexa, physicians
rely upon the misinformation and prescribe Zyprexa, TPPs relying on
the advice of PBMs and their Pharmacy and Therapeutics Committees
place Zyprexa on their formularies as approved drugs.”126 Perhaps
fatally, the TPPs did not allege they relied on the manufacturer’s misrepresentations, but rather that the physicians did.127 As such, the
court found that unless it can be proved that all prescription decisions
and Useful Information, BIOWORLD, http://www.bioworld.com/content/label-use-fine-line-be
tween-illegal-promotion-and-useful-information (last visited Nov. 13, 2016).
117. UFCW Local 1776, 620 F.3d at 127.
118. Id. at 128.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 125.
122. Id.
123. UFCW Local 1776, 620 F.3d at 125.
124. Id. at 124.
125. Id. at 124–25. Confidential internal documents revealed Ely Lilly was aware of these side
effects, but did not understand the source of them.
126. Id. at 134.
127. Id.
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by every doctor were made in reliance on the drug manufacturer’s
fraudulent misrepresentations, the chain of causation is severed.128
The court held that it was the TPPs failure to negotiate the price of
Zyprexa with the manufacturer that resulted in overpaying for the
drug.129 Consequently, the conduct giving rise to the harm—the failure to negotiate—was considered distinct from the conduct giving rise
to the fraud—the alleged misrepresentations.130 There was evidence
that TPPs requested rebates from the manufacturer or internally restricted the use of Zyprexa for some indications.131 But even after the
drug’s side effects were made public most TPPs continued paying full
price for its prescription.132 Further, the court held the TPPs’ “theory
of liability rests on the independent action of third and even fourth
parties,” given that physicians, PBMs, and others are all links on the
chain between the manufacturer and TPPs thereby making the chain
too attenuated.133
2. Ninth Circuit Approach to RICO Causation
In In re Epogen, two TPPs attempted to bring a RICO claim
against Amgen, one of the United States’ largest pharmaceutical companies.134 The TPPs’ complaint did not survive a motion to dismiss
because it alleged a weak causal chain between the drug manufacturer
and the TPPs.135 The court held the causal link pled was insufficient
to satisfy the proximate cause requirements for RICO claims set forth
by the Supreme Court in Bridge.136
The TPPs alleged Amgen unlawfully promoted two drugs, Epogen
and Aranesp (jointly, EPO), that stimulated the production of red
blood cells.137 In 1989, the FDA approved Epogen for treating anemia in chronic renal failure patients, HIV patients, and cancer patients
undergoing chemotherapy.138 In 2001, Aranesp was approved for similar uses.139 In 2007, an article was published by The Cancer Letter
regarding increased mortality rates in cancer patients that utilized
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Id. at 134–36.
UFCW Local 1776, 620 F.3d at 134.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
In re Epogen, 590 F. Supp. 2d at 1284.
United Food & Commercial Workers Cent. Pa,. 400 F. App’x at 257.
Id.
In re Epogen, 590 F. Supp. 2d at 1284–85.
Id. at 1285.
Id.
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Aranesp.140 As a result, the FDA issued a black box warning for offlabel uses of EPO.141 This warning also included results of a study
indicating some cancer patients taking EPO died in half the time of
patients that were given placebos.142 The TPPs argued Amgen engaged in racketeering activity, including mail and wire fraud, by unlawfully promoting EPO for unsafe, off-label uses.143
The Ninth Circuit held the complaint failed to “identify statements
or representations made by Amgen that were false or misleading at
the time they were made, as required in a civil RICO action based on
mail and wire fraud.”144 While the TPPs alleged the manufacturer
concealed adverse test results, they failed to identify particular study
results that Amgen allegedly promoted.145 Finally, the causal chain
between the manufacturer and TPPs was considered too attenuated
because there were at least four separate links: “(1) the manufacturer’s listing of Aranesp to treat anemia of cancer, (2) Medicare’s
consequent decision to cover Aranesp for anemia of cancer, (3) TPPs’
decision to cover Aranesp for anemia of cancer (along with heart failure patients and others), and (4) doctors’ prescription decisions to
prescribe Aranesp and Epogen.”146 The court suggested a drug manufacturer is too remote from a TPP-plaintiff when third parties exist in
the chain leading to a particular drug being prescribed.147 In this case,
the involvement of the manufacturer, Medicare, and physicians gave
rise to a remoteness the TPPs were unable to overcome in order to
establish proximate cause for the economic loss they suffered.148 The
court emphasized the need for a strong causal link between the manufacturer and the alleged injured party which, fatally, the TPPs were
unable to establish.149
III.

ANALYSIS

This Circuit split highlights a potentially disastrous outcome: that
fraudulent conduct causing direct harm could go unpunished and un140. Paul Goldberg, FDA’s ODAC To Review EPO Agents In May; SEC Probes Amgen Delay In Study Disclosure, THE CANCER LETTER, Mar. 2, 2007, at 1, 8.
141. In re Epogen, 590 F. Supp. 2d at 1285–86.
142. Id. at 1286.
143. Id. at 1287.
144. United Food & Commercial Workers Cent. Pa., 400 F. App’x at 257.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 257 (quoting Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268 (1992)).
148. Id.
149. Id.
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compensated.150 This Part argues that adoption of the approach by
the First and Third Circuits is preferable because it (1) increases accountability of drug manufacturers towards TPPs when marketing
new drugs, (2) more closely reflects the Supreme Court’s characterization of proximate cause, and (3) accurately captures the foreseeability
requirement of proximate cause utilized in other areas of tort law.151
A. Increasing Drug Manufacturer Accountability
Drug manufacturer marketing often targets TPPs as they ultimately
pay for some, if not all, of a prescription’s cost.152 Accordingly, misleading marketing results in significant economic loss for TPPs and
they have limited or no effective recourse. Even when marketing is
directed towards physicians, its impact is problematic as it interferes
with the physician’s ability to make independent decisions concerning
the patient.153 While this Comment has explored a relatively small
sampling of RICO case law, the reality is that fraudulent and misleading conduct by drug manufacturers in the United States is rampant.154
First, this Section explores the prevalence of such conduct. Next, this
section explores why adopting the First and Third Circuits’ approach
would more effectively combat the issue.155

150. UFCW Local 1776, 620 F.3d at 134; United Food & Commercial Workers Cent. Pa., 400
F. App’x at 255 (both cases illustrating situations where conduct that was clearly fraudulent and
misleading on the part of drug manufacturers was nevertheless held to fall short of the standard
required to receive RICO reprimand).
151. Bridge, 553 U.S. at 639; Overseas Tankship (U.K.), Ltd., v. Morts Dock & Eng’g Co. (The
Wagon Mound No. 1), [1961] AC 388, 1961 WL 20739.
152. This data is based on 2014 expenditures. Sifferlin, supra note 1.
153. Brief for AARP et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Sergeants Benevolent
Ass’n Health & Welfare Fund at 12, 137 S. Ct. 140 (2016) (mem) (No. 15-1525) (quoting Sheryl
Calabro, Note, Breaking the Shield of the Learned Intermediary Doctrine: Placing the Blame
Where It Belongs, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 2241, 2259 (2003–2004)). See also Lori-Ann Rickard &
Amy Fehn, Recent Developments in Regulation of Pharmaceutical Marketing Practices, HEALTH
LAW., Dec. 2006, at 16, 16 (finding that “physicians’ prescribing practices are . . . affected by
interactions with drug companies”); Jason Dana & George Lowenstein, A Social Science Perspective on Gifts to Physicians from Industry, 290 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 252, 252 (2003).
154. Brief for AARP et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Sergeants Benevolent
Ass’n Health & Welfare Fund at 3, 137 S. Ct. 140 (2016) (mem) (No. 15-1525).
155. See, e.g., In re Avandia, 804 F.3d at 634; In re Neurontin, 712 F.3d at 26; UFCW Local
1776, 620 F.3d at 132; United Food & Commercial Workers Cent. Pa., 400 F. App’x at 257; Brief
for AARP et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Sergeants Benevolent Ass’n Health &
Welfare Fund at 7, 137 S. Ct. 140 (2016) (mem) (No. 15-1525).
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1. Prevalence of Fraudulent and Misleading Pharmaceutical
Advertising
Despite FDA regulations squarely prohibiting false or misleading
statements concerning drug safety and effectiveness,156 manufacturers
still frequently engage in this conduct.157 From 2001 to 2005, the FDA
sent at least 170 notices to over eighty companies for false and misleading drug advertising.158 These notices highlighted the companies’
concealment of negative clinical trial results and misreporting.159 Further, between 2003 and 2007, the FDA sent notices to pharmaceutical
companies concerning unlawful promotion of off-label drug uses that
exposed patients to considerable risk of harm.160 All the while, TPPs
continued to reimburse prescription medications for their insured despite this fraudulent behavior.161 The FDA has noted, “it is very difficult, if not impossible, for [the] FDA’s supplementary monitoring and
surveillance efforts to identify all off-label promotion that may
occur.”162
Pharmaceutical companies often utilize industry-funded clinical
studies in advertisements.163 These studies routinely generate biased
results instead of objective evidence, which taints decisions made concerning drug efficacy and safety.164 For instance Neurontin, was promoted165 via commissioned research.166 The pharmaceutical company
156. 21 C.F.R. § 99.101(a)(4) (1998); Brief for AARP et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Sergeants Benevolent Ass’n Health & Welfare Fund at 7, 137 S. Ct. 140 (2016) (mem)
(No. 15-1525).
157. Brief for AARP et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Sergeants Benevolent
Ass’n Health & Welfare Fund at 7, 137 S. Ct. 140 (2016) (mem) (No. 15-1525).
158. Id. See also ABIGAIL CAPLOVITZ, TURNING MEDICINE INTO SNAKE OIL: HOW PHARMACEUTICAL MARKETERS PUT PATIENTS AT RISK 7 (2006).
159. Brief for AARP et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Sergeants Benevolent
Ass’n Health & Welfare Fund at 7, 137 S. Ct. 140 (2016) (mem) (No. 15-1525). See also
CAPLOVITZ, supra note 158, at 1.
160. Brief for AARP et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Sergeants Benevolent
Ass’n Health & Welfare Fund at 7, 137 S. Ct. 140 (2016) (mem) (No. 15-1525). See also Prescription Drugs: FDA’s Oversight of the Promotion of Drugs for Off-Label Uses at 5–6, U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFF. (July 2008).
161. In re Neurontin, 712 F.3d at 40–41.
162. Brief for AARP et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Sergeants Benevolent
Ass’n Health & Welfare Fund at 7, 137 S. Ct. 140 (2016) (mem) (No. 15-1525). See also Prescription Drugs: FDA’s Oversight, supra note 160.
163. Brief for AARP et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Sergeants Benevolent
Ass’n Health & Welfare Fund at 8, 137 S. Ct. 140 (2016) (mem) (No. 15-1525).
164. Id.
165. The drug was promoted at the time by Parke-Davis, a division of Warner-Lambert whose
parent company is Pfizer. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Warner-Lambert to Pay $430 Million
to Resolve Criminal & Civil Health Care Liability Relating to Off-Label Promotion (May 13,
2004), https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2004/May/04_civ_322.htm.
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formulated a “publication strategy”167 whereby academics were solicited with various grants and speaking opportunities168 to publish and
promote Neurontin.169 Additional marketing tactics involved publishing Neurontin research while disguising its promotional purpose and
conducting teleconferences with prescribing physicians that were
moderated by well-remunerated contracted physicians involved in the
marketing scheme.170 This initiative proved wildly successful, and resulted in “tremendous sales . . . for uses for which it was not effective.”171 Sales for the drug rose in the U.S. from $98 million to $3
billion.172 The manufacturer was eventually found to have engaged in
“illegal and fraudulent promotion”173 of Neurontin, which “corrupted
the information process relied upon by doctors . . . thereby putting
patients at risk [and] depriving health plans of the informed, impartial
judgment of medical professionals . . . on which the program relies to
allocate scarce financial resources to provide necessary and appropriate care.”174
Another well-known example of this is a study of the drug Vioxx
funded by Merck & Company (Merck).175 Prior to the FDA approving the drug in 1999, Merck conducted the study176 in an effort to
prove Vioxx was a superior painkiller that resulted in fewer gastrointestinal issues compared to its competitors.177 The apparent purpose
of the study was to test the drug’s safety, but it was later discovered
166. Seth Landefeld & Michael A. Steinman, The Neurontin Legacy—Marketing through
Misinformation and Manipulation, 360 NEW ENG. J. MED. 103, 103–06 (2009).
167. Id.; Brief for AARP et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Sergeants Benevolent
Ass’n Health & Welfare Fund at 9, 137 S. Ct. 140 (2016) (mem) (No. 15-1525).
168. Landefeld & Steinman, supra note 166, at 104.
169. Id.; Brief for AARP et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Sergeants Benevolent
Ass’n Health & Welfare Fund at 9, 137 S. Ct. 140 (2016) (mem) (No. 15-1525).
170. Landefeld & Steinman, supra note 166, at 104 (some of these physicians were paid
upwards of $170,000 over four years to moderate these phone calls and market the “benefits” of
Neurontin to prescribing physicians).
171. Brief for AARP et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Sergeants Benevolent
Ass’n Health & Welfare Fund at 9, 137 S. Ct. 140 (2016) (mem) (No. 15-1525); Landefeld, supra
note 166, at 104.
172. Landefeld & Steinman, supra note 166, at 104.
173. Brief for AARP et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Sergeants Benevolent
Ass’n Health & Welfare Fund at 9, 137 S. Ct. 140 (2016) (mem) (No. 15-1525).
174. DOJ Press Release, supra note 165.
175. Kevin P. Hill et al., The ADVANTAGE Seeding Trial: A Review of Internal Documents,
149 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 251, 251–58 (2008); Brief for AARP et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Sergeants Benevolent Ass’n Health & Welfare Fund at 8, 137 S. Ct. 140 (2016)
(mem) (No. 15-1525).
176. Claire Bombardier et. al., Comparison of Upper Gastrointestinal Toxicity of Rofecoxib
and Naproxen in Patients with Rheumatoid Arthritis, 343 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1520, 1528 (2000).
177. Snigdha Prakash & Vikki Valentine, Timeline: The Rise and Fall of Vioxx, NPR (Nov. 10,
2007), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5470430.
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Merck’s marketing department designed the study to boost sales.178
The study eventually indicated Vioxx caused heart attacks, strokes,
and even death.179 Both the study’s result and purpose were not disclosed to the participants or the New England Journal of Medicine
(NEJM) which published the study.180 Five years after the drug was
released, Merck discontinued sale of Vioxx.181 Unfortunately, Vioxx
had already generated billions of dollars in sales worldwide, in part
due to the clinical study.182 The NEJM’s Editor-in-Chief later revealed the journal was “hoodwinked” by the manufacturer and the
authors of the study should have disclosed the side effects prior to
initial publication.183
These illustrations demonstrate misconduct is ongoing and costing
TPPs millions of dollars as they are paying for prescription drugs they
would not have included in their formularies absent pharmaceutical
fraud.184 The First and Third Circuits offer a solution for TPPs targeting the deep pockets of pharmaceutical companies. This approach
could further deter unlawful drug promotion and advertising
practices.
2. The Approach that Leaves Intact the Causal Chain
The First and Third Circuits’ approach adheres to the Supreme
Court’s RICO jurisprudence,185 while sufficiently deterring drug manufacturers from fraudulently exaggerating drug safety and efficacy.186
The Supreme Court has held that RICO contains both but-for and
proximate causation requirements.187 While not articulating an ex178. Hill, supra note 175, at 251–58; Brief for AARP et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Sergeants Benevolent Ass’n Health & Welfare Fund at 8, 137 S. Ct. 140 (2016) (mem)
(No. 15-1525).
179. Prakash, supra note 177.
180. Brief for AARP et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Sergeants Benevolent
Ass’n Health & Welfare Fund at 8, 137 S. Ct. 140 (2016) (mem) (No. 15-1525).
181. Prakash, supra note 177.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Brief for AARP et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Sergeants Benevolent
Ass’n Health & Welfare Fund at 7, 137 S. Ct. 140 (2016) (mem) (No. 15-1525). See e.g., In re
Neurontin, 712 F.3d at 41 (Kaiser estimated it suffered $60 million in losses as a result of Pfizer’s
misrepresentations); Prescription Drugs: FDA’s Oversight, supra note 160.
185. UFCW Local 1776, 620 F.3d at 131. A substantive RICO violation involves engaging in
any of the “racketeering” activities listed in 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1), such as mail and wire fraud.
This is a common ground for RICO claims against drug manufacturers as they circulate their
misrepresentations to TPPs using these methods. See, e.g., Sergeants, 806 F.3d at 74; In re
Avandia, 804 F.3d at 636; In re Neurontin, 712 F.3d at 34; In re Epogen, 590 F. Supp. 2d at 1287.
186. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Sergeants Benevolent Ass’n Health & Welfare Fund at 15,
137 S. Ct. 140 (2016) (mem) (No. 15-1525).
187. Holmes, 503 U.S. at 268 (1992); In re Neurontin, 712 F.3d at 34.
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plicit rule, the Court has held proximate cause requires “some direct
relation between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged.”188 Providing further explanation, the Court has noted the link
should not be too remote189 and first-party reliance on the misrepresentation is not necessarily required.190 Additionally, the Court articulated three factors that emphasize the need for directness between
the injury and alleged misconduct: (1) proof of injury, (2) administrative efficiency, and (3) public policy.191 Finally, the injury192 must
have been caused by the substantive RICO violation.193
The First Circuit adopted an approach to proximate cause that is
consistent with the Supreme Court in Holmes.194 In In re Neurontin,
the First Circuit analyzed the three factors discussed by the Court,
highlighting the complexity that could arise if courts began recognizing claims from plaintiffs indirectly injured.195 Additionally, the First
Circuit noted the public policy interest in deterring illegal conduct
and questioned whether a finding of proximate cause would serve that
interest.196
Based on its own considerations, informed by the Supreme Court’s
approach in Holmes, the First Circuit held that “the causal chain is
anything but attenuated” between the drug manufacturer and
TPPs.197 In explaining why the injury was sufficiently direct, the court
emphasized that Pfizer understood the structure of the U.S. healthcare system and that the drugs would be paid for by TPPs rather than
physicians.198 Pfizer targeted TPPs because it knew the drug would
only be prescribed and paid for if it landed near the top of the TPPs’
formularies.199 In order to ensure this high ranking, Pfizer funneled
the fraudulent information directly to the TPPs, which then included it
in their monographs.200 Thus, the fraudulent marketing scheme would
only be successful if the TPP was provided with the false misrepresen188. Holmes, 503 U.S. at 268 (1992); In re Neurontin, 712 F.3d at 34.
189. Holmes, 503 U.S. at 268, 271.
190. Bridge, 553 U.S. at 639.
191. Holmes, 503 U.S. at 269–70; In re Neurontin, 712 F.3d at 36.
192. The Supreme Court has clarified that such injury is economic in nature and constitutes
injury to one’s business or property. Bridge, 553 U.S. at 649.
193. UFCW Local 1776, 620 F.3d at 131. This element effectively constitutes the causation
requirement. Id.
194. Holmes, 503 U.S. at 268; In re Neurontin, 712 F.3d at 36.
195. Holmes, 503 U.S. at 268; In re Neurontin, 712 F.3d at 36.
196. Holmes, 503 U.S. at 268; In re Neurontin, 712 F.3d at 36.
197. In re Neurontin, 712 F.3d at 38.
198. Id. at 38–39.
199. Id.
200. Id.
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tations.201 Because Kaiser and other TPPs were the intended victims
of the racketeering activity, the economic injury they suffered was
foreseeable.202 The court took this approach a step further and held
that even if a manufacturer directs its misrepresentations towards prescribing doctors, the causal link is not automatically broken because
direct reliance on the misrepresentations by TPPs is not required.203
The Third Circuit has also followed the Supreme Court’s guidance
on proximate cause that a “plaintiff’s loss must be a foreseeable result
of someone’s reliance on the misrepresentation.”204 In Avandia, the
manufacturer misrepresented to TPPs the safety risks associated with
a diabetes drug and marketed the drug as cheaper and more effective
than existing alternatives.205 As a result, the TPPs included Avandia
in its formularies and covered a higher percentage of the prescription’s cost; specifically, TPPs paid approximately $140 per month for
Avandia prescriptions, as opposed to $40 to $50 for the alternatives.206
In applying the Supreme Court’s approach, the Third Circuit found
the TPPs were the drug manufacturer’s “primary and intended victims,” and the economic harm they suffered was a “foreseeable and
natural consequence of [the] scheme.”207 Accordingly, the actions of
the manufacturer were deemed a sufficiently direct cause of the TPPs
injury to satisfy the proximate cause requirements of a RICO claim.208
B. The Approach that Severs the Causal Chain
This Section explores the Second and Ninth Circuit’s approach to
RICO causation, which holds prescription decisions of physicians
sever causation between manufacturers and TPPs.209 This Section addresses the Second Circuit decision in UFCW Local 1776 and the
Ninth Circuit decision in United Food.210 The Second and Ninth Circuits assert that, even if the TPPs suffer harm as a result of manufacturer fraud, when similar misrepresentations are made to prescribing
physicians, TPPs effectively lose their standing to bring a RICO claim
as the directness of the TPPs reliance on the misrepresentations is
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. In re Neurontin, 712 F.3d at 37.
204. In re Avandia, 804 F.3d at 645 (quoting Bridge, 553 U.S. at 655).
205. Id. at 635.
206. Id. at 636.
207. Id. at 645 (quoting Bridge, 553 U.S. at 658).
208. Id.
209. UFCW Local 1776, 620 F.3d at 121; United Food & Commercial Workers Cent. Pa., 400
Fed. App’x at 257.
210. UFCW Local 1776, 620 F.3d 121 at 134; United Food & Commercial Workers Cent. Pa.,
400 Fed. App’x at 257.
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clouded.211 The approach of these circuits raises concerns for TPPs
and consumers alike by limiting TPPs’ ability to recover for economic
loss suffered as a result of drug manufacturer fraud, and exposing consumers to serious health complications.212
The facts in UFCW are similar to those in In re Neurontin and In re
Avandia.213 Drug manufacturers distributed misinformation concerning the drug Zyprexa to TPPs that utilized the information to place
the drug on their formularies.214 Consequently, patients that were
prescribed the drug suffered significant weight gain and other side effects that were concealed by the manufacturer.215 The Second Circuit
held that the TPPs made a critical procedural error by alleging physicians, rather than TPPs, relied on the manufacturers’ misrepresentations thereby precluding TPPs from recovering under RICO.216
Nevertheless, TPPs were victims of fraud and suffered economic loss
because Zyprexa was included in its formularies at a higher price than
it would have been if the TPPs were aware of the drug’s possible side
effects.217 In effect, TPPs overpaid for Zyprexa at a rate $77 higher
than competitor products due to its purported greater efficacy.218 The
Second Circuit created an artificial distinction between the directness
of fraud suffered by physicians and TPPs.219 While marketing
Zyprexa, manufacturers engaged in direct misrepresentation to TPPs
affecting the drug’s pricing by obscuring its side effects.220 There was
evidence that most TPPs continued paying full price for Zyprexa prescriptions even after the drug’s side effects were made public, but this
does not negate the economic loss suffered by TPPs as a result of the
manufacturer’s initial fraud.221 Given the court stated the failure of
TPPs to negotiate Zyprexa’s price demonstrated a lack of proximate
cause, it seems rather unlikely the Second Circuit’s decision would
have materially changed if TPPs were clearer in alleging their reliance
on manufacturers’ misrepresentations.222 This represents a departure
from the First and Third Circuits’ approach because despite levelling a
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

UFCW Local 1776, 620 F.3d at 134.
United Food & Commercial Workers Cent. Pa., 400 Fed. App’x at 257.
In re Avandia, 804 F.3d at 635; In re Neurontin, 712 F.3d at 27–29.
UFCW Local 1776, 620 F.3d at 124–25.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 127.
Id.
Id. at 134.
UFCW Local 1776, 620 F.3d at 134.
Id.
Id.
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form of fraud directly towards TPPs,223 the Second Circuit appears to
have carved out an additional responsibility for TPPs (that is, to negotiate pricing) in order to bring a successful RICO claim.224
The Ninth Circuit in United Food also severed the causal chain between drug manufacturers and TPPs because there were other parties
in the chain that caused physicians to make prescription decisions.225
While the manufacturer promoted EPO for unsafe uses,226 the court
nevertheless precluded TPP recovery under RICO due to the existence of third parties, such as Medicare and physicians, that led to the
prescription of EPO.227 In the view of the Ninth Circuit, the presence
of these third parties somehow created a remoteness that severed the
causal chain between manufacturers and TPPs.228 The improper promotion of EPO relied on by TPPs, however, appears to be the type of
“direct relation” the Supreme Court has found establishes proximate
cause.229
C. Analogizing Foreseeability in the TPP Context to Personal
Injury Claims
To further support implementation of the First and Third Circuit
approach, it is helpful to consider the analogous operation of proximate cause in other areas of tort law.230
In personal injury cases, a defendant’s unreasonable conduct will be
the proximate cause of an injury if the injury is reasonably foreseeable
given the risk of the conduct, regardless of the extent or manner of the
harm.231 If the injury is too remote from the defendant’s unreasonable conduct, it will be unforeseeable and outside the scope of defendant’s liability.232
As noted above, the actions taken by drug
manufacturers were calculated and intentional.233 Drug manufacturers appear to be targeting TPPs because they are the largest financers
of prescription medication and TPPs make decisions to include drugs
on their formularies based on the fraudulent misrepresentations of
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. United Food & Commercial Workers Cent. Pa., 400 F. App’x at 257.
226. In re Epogen, 590 F. Supp. 2d at 1287.
227. United Food & Commercial Workers Cent. Pa., 400 F. App’x at 257.
228. Id.
229. Holmes, 503 U.S. at 268.
230. See, e.g., The Wagon Mound No. 1 [1961] AC 388, 1961 WL 20739.
231. Id.; Hughes v. Lord Advocate [1963] A.C. 837 (H.L.).
232. The Wagon Mound No. 1 [1961] AC 388, 1961 WL 20739.
233. See, e.g., In re Avandia, 804 F.3d at 635; In re Neurontin, 712 F.3d at 27–28; UFCW Local
1776, 620 F.3d at 124; In re Epogen, 590 F. Supp. 2d at 1284–85.
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manufacturers.234 Therefore, the economic injury they suffer in paying for prescriptions is clearly foreseeable.235
In personal injury cases, a defendant may argue a certain event or
action was an intervening cause that severed liability.236 An intervening cause severs a defendant’s liability to the plaintiff when it is a superseding cause.237 One such intervening cause is a “third party
intentional act.”238 Manufacturers may therefore argue the prescribing decisions of physicians constitute third party intentional acts that
sever the causal chain destroying a TPP’s RICO claim.239 However,
because drug manufacturers directly provide misinformation to TPPs,
they effectively lay the foundation for the fraudulent scheme. Providing information to TPPs and physicians alike is so interrelated, that to
distinguish them would be a fiction and result in manufacturers unjustly escaping billions of dollars in liability.
IV. IMPACT
This Part canvasses the impact of adopting the First and Third Circuit approach to proximate cause by allowing TPPs to bring RICO
claims regardless of physician prescription decisions.240 First, this Part
discusses how this approach protects consumers’ health and safety.
Second, this Part examines how this approach compensates TPPs for
significant economic loss resulting from drug manufacturer
misconduct.
A. Protecting Consumers’ Health and Safety
Preserving the chain of causation between drug manufacturers and
TPPs protects the health and safety of U.S. healthcare consumers.
The cases discussed in this Comment share a common thread—consumers have suffered physical injuries as a result of unsafe drugs being
intentionally introduced into the market.241 These injuries were clear
in the First and Third Circuit decisions discussed above.242 In In re
234. In re Avandia, 804 F.3d at 635–36; In re Neurontin, 712 F.3d at 27–29; UFCW Local 1776,
620 F.3d at 124–25, 127–28; In re Epogen, 590 F. Supp. 2d at 1290–91.
235. In re Avandia, 804 F.3d at 638.
236. Derdiarian v. Felix, 417 N.E.2d 1010 (N.Y. 1980).
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. See, e.g., UFCW Local 1776, 620 F.3d at 121; United Food & Commercial Workers Cent.
Pa., 400 F. App’x at 255.
240. In re Avandia, 804 F.3d at 645; In re Neurontin, 712 F.3d at 38–39.
241. In re Avandia, 804 F.3d at 634; In re Neurontin, 712 F.3d at 27; UFCW Local 1776, 620
F.3d at 124; In re Epogen, 590 F. Supp. 2d at 1286.
242. In re Avandia, 804 F.3d at 634; In re Neurontin, 712 F.3d at 27.
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Neurontin, the manufacturer failed to disclose all possible side effects
of the drug and consequently patients suffered from depression and
suicidal tendencies.243 In In re Avandia, a diabetes drug touted as
safer and more effective than competing products ultimately exposed
consumers to a greater risk of heart attack and death caused by heartrelated disease.244 Even though the Second and Ninth Circuits allowed manufacturers to evade liability, these cases nonetheless involved consumers who suffered physical injury at the hands of
manufacturers.245 In UFCW, there was evidence that the manufacturer’s schizophrenia medication caused significant weight gain, a side
effect that the manufacturer withheld from consumers and TPPs
alike.246 Finally, United Food involved a drug that treated cancer patients undergoing chemotherapy.247 The drug was eventually discovered to increase mortality rates in cancer patients, with one study
revealing some patients taking the drug died in half the time of those
given a placebo.248
Ensuring TPPs can continue to bring RICO claims will deter manufacturers from intentionally misleading the public.249 Even if the manufacturer is not intentionally misleading the public, this approach
incentivizes manufacturers to submit accurate information and accurately define their products. Under RICO, a party that brings suit can
recover treble damages.250 While consumers could bring a claim
against a manufacturer,251 their damages likely do not rise to the level
of TPPs’. Damages suffered by TPPs are routinely hundreds of millions of dollars, and trebling such amounts obviously serves as a
greater deterrence.252
B. Compensating TPPs for Economic Loss Suffered
Establishing a proximate cause standard that makes it impossible
for TPPs to bring RICO claims when they have significant economic
loss due to the intentionally misleading, fraudulent behavior of manufacturers leaves TPPs with no judicial recourse for their injuries.
243. In re Neurontin, 712 F.3d at 27.
244. Id.
245. UFCW Local 1776, 620 F.3d at 124.
246. Id.
247. In re Epogen, 590 F. Supp. 2d at 1285.
248. Id. at 1286; Goldberg, supra note 140.
249. In re Avandia, 804 F.3d at 635.
250. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2016).
251. Id.
252. In re Neurontin, 799 F. Supp. 2d at 110 (TPP plaintiff awarded $174 million in damages);
DOJ Press Release, supra note 165.
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When a superior, innovative drug is promoted, TPPs will cover a large
portion of the drug’s cost.253 This, in turn, reduces the consumer’s copayment and makes the drug more affordable.254 Because TPPs are
vital to affordable prescription medication, TPPs should be entitled to
recover for substantial economic losses suffered at the hands of fraudulent drug manufacturers.255
V.

CONCLUSION

This Comment advocates for courts to allow TPPs to hold drug
manufacturers accountable for their fraudulent behavior. Manufacturers deliberately target TPPs in their marketing efforts and intentionally mislead and defraud them to increase profits.256 This should
be considered sufficiently direct to establish proximate cause. The economic injury suffered by TPPs and the devastating health consequences to the public are clear.257 If faced with this circuit split, the
Supreme Court should hold the causal chain is intact, and allow those
directly harmed by the deceitful actions of manufacturers to receive
compensation.
Mona Ghogomu*

253. In re Avandia, 804 F.3d at 635.
254. Id. (discussing reduced co-payments for consumers).
255. In re Neurontin, 799 F. Supp. 2d at 110 (TPP plaintiff awarded $174 million in damages);
DOJ Press Release, supra note 165 (detailing the multi-million dollar losses suffered by TPPs at
the hands of drug manufacturers).
256. See In re Avandia, 804 F.3d at 636; In re Neurontin, 712 F.3d at 27; UFCW Local 1776,
620 F.3d at 128.
257. In re Avandia, 804 F.3d at 634; In re Neurontin, 712 F.3d at 27; UFCW Local 1776, 620
F.3d at 124; In re Epogen, 590 F. Supp. 2d at 1286.
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